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Richard H. Thaler – Cass R. Sunstein: 
Nudge: Improving Decisions about 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness
New Haven 2008: Yale University Press, 
293 pp.
Richard Thaler, an economist at the Uni-
versity of Chicago’s School of Business, is 
one of the founders of modern behaviour-
al economics, along with the economists 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Cass 
Sunstein is a legal scholar at Harvard Uni-
versity and has been at the forefront of ap-
plying the results of experimental econom-
ics to social problems, especially in the ﬁ eld 
of law. This book has one ‘big idea’, and it 
is a very important one. The idea is called 
‘status quo bias’, meaning that in many 
choice situations people value the status 
quo (what they currently have) and will 
forego the opportunity to switch to an al-
ternative unless the alternative is signiﬁ -
cantly more attractive than the status quo. 
In situations where it is difﬁ cult to evaluate 
the exact beneﬁ ts and costs of what one has 
over what one could only obtain with some 
conscious effort, people will tend to stick 
with what they have. For example, in the 
United States, the default condition with 
respect to organ donation is ‘no donation’, 
so if people want to donate their organs 
when they die, they must explicitly state 
this preference. In France, the default con-
dition is ‘donation’, and an individual who 
does not agree with this default condition 
must expressly indicate their desire not to 
donate. Consequently, the rate of organ do-
nation is France is several times higher than 
it is in the United States. 
While policies that exploit the sta-
tus quo bias may be called ‘paternalistic’, 
they cannot be said to violate individual 
rights, and in a democracy, for most indi-
viduals, many may be termed ‘self-disci-
plining’. For instance, by law a little bell 
rings incessantly in my car whenever any-
one fails to attach their seatbelt. I can easily 
dis able this bell, but I welcome it as an aid 
in overcoming my inertia in the enforce-
ment of automobile safety procedures. The 
idea behind Nudge is that the choice of a 
default condition can both allow individu-
als to choose as they please in a democratic 
market society, while at the same time im-
proving social outcomes by providing de-
fault conditions that lead to socially use-
ful choices. Thaler and Sunstein call this 
‘libertarian paternalism’. While one might 
think that this sort of minimal market in-
tervention can have only a limited impact 
on social outcomes, the organ donation 
example suggests otherwise. Perhaps the 
most important policy of this type would 
be a mandate that employers make contri-
butions to retirement savings, in the form 
of 401(k) or other plans, which would be 
the default, so that individuals who do not 
wish to save would have to register the de-
sire to opt out of the plans. A related idea 
developed in the book is that employees 
commit to saving a certain fraction of fu-
ture raises they are awarded by employers, 
the idea being that people do not want to 
reduce their ‘status quo’ income in order 
to save, but they may be willing to accept 
a new, lower ‘status quo’ when the status 
quo changes. 
This is a very sensible idea. The justi-
ﬁ cation of the assumption that one default 
condition is preferable to another is gener-
ally the assertion that individuals are sys-
tematically prone to overstate the value of 
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immediate gratiﬁ cation and understate the 
value of future pay-offs. This is often called 
‘hyperbolic discounting’ in the literature, 
but the real issue is excessive present-ori-
entation, which can occur just as easily 
with exponential, time-consistent prefer-
ences, as with hyperbolic, time-inconsist-
ent preferences. For instance, making re-
tirement saving the default arrangement 
can serve to counter the tendency to un-
der-save, which is itself a response to the 
overvaluation of current as compared to 
retirement consumption. A second justi-
ﬁ cation is the tendency for individuals to 
ignore low probability events, such as hav-
ing an automobile accident. I consider the 
irritating bell that sounds in my car to be 
a present pain that offsets the present pain 
of fastening my seatbelt, given that I can-
not really experience the pain of great bod-
ily injury with an inﬁ nitesimal probability 
0.00001. 
A second sort of libertarian paternal-
ism takes the form of having the govern-
ment require that ﬁ rms reveal with clarity 
and salience the full terms of a contractual 
agreement with consumers. For instance, 
it might be required that a restaurant print 
the nutritional content of its food on the 
menu, or that the precise interest rate on a 
mortgage be posted, or that all of a broker’s 
charges be itemised on a monthly state-
ment. These measures are ‘paternalistic’, 
because if consumers were fully aware of 
the situation, they might demand this in-
formation from ﬁ rms, and market compe-
tition would then lead to compliance. The 
role of the government in this situation 
would then be the more traditional one of 
enforcing ‘truth in advertising’ – ﬁ rms are 
not allowed to misrepresent their offerings. 
This form of social policy may also not re-
ally be paternalistic. If the transaction costs 
are high enough, I might tolerate the res-
taurant’s practice of not revealing nutri-
tional content, even though I would be 
willing to pay to have this information re-
vealed, but I would not be willing to pay to 
offset the restaurant’s revenue loss because 
I eat smaller portions of healthier food. If 
my unwillingness to pay is due to my ex-
cessive present-orientation, and if I recog-
nise this, I prefer the government regula-
tion for myself.
Thaler and Sunstein, like other behav-
ioural economic policy analysts, are widely 
criticised for their paternalism, which ﬂ ies 
in the face of free-market ideology. While 
some suspicion is warranted, the idea of 
a market economy with no governmental 
correctives is just a libertarian fantasy that 
people neither want nor with which they 
could comfortably live. Policies of the sort 
discussed in this volume are a welcome ad-
dition to the policy-maker’s toolbox. Liber-
tarian paternalism, of course, is not a pana-
cea. It will not replace the price system as 
the central mechanism for allocating goods 
and services, and it will not obviate the 
need for legislation that corrects market 
failures, such as the tendency for excessive 
energy use to undermine the natural envi-
ronment, and perhaps even partially off-
sets such ‘human frailties’ as the tendency 
to under-save and abuse illegal substances. 
However, libertarian paternalism is attrac-
tive as a ﬁ rst line of attack on even these 
problems and should be part of the policy-
maker’s toolkit.
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George Loewenstein: Exotic Preferences: 
Behavioural Economics and Human 
Motivation
Oxford 2008: Oxford University Press, 
671 pp. 
Behavioural economics, the marriage of 
insights from psychology and econom-
ics, has matured from a fringe interest of 
a small handful of researchers towards ac-
